Evil,2 Alvin Plantinga contends that the argument I offered in that earlier paper for this thesis is mistaken and that there is no good reason for thinking that God's foreknowledge of future actions has any implications as regards human freedom. Plantinga approaches the problem using the conceptual apparatus of possible worlds ontology. He obviously thinks that this approach provides a clearer look at the issues than has hitherto been available. In this brief paper I want to join with Plantinga in working through the traditional problem of divine foreknowledge from this point of view. Though the conclusion I shall reach is the same as it was in my earlier publication, perhaps this alternative way of formulating the argument will provide fruitful perspective.
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I
A being counts as omniscient just in case (1) that being believes all true propositions; and (2) that being believes no propositions that are false. Assume that God is essentially omniscient. This is to say (using the vocabulary of possible worlds) that God possesses the attribute of omniscience in every possible world in which he exists. 
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It follows that in every possible world in which God exists, if a proposition P is true, God believes that P is true, and if God believes that P is true, P is true. Grant, secondly, that God is a being who is everlasting, that is, a being whose life extends indefinitely both forwards and backwards in time. For any time T, God exists at T. Allow, finally, that God's beliefs do not change from time to time. Anything that God believes at one time is something that he believes at all times. Now suppose that some individual, Jones, performs an action X at a particular time 12-for example, Jones goes for a walk on the beach on Friday afternoon. If God exists, it follows that God believes that Jones does X at 12. Since for any given time, there is a prior time at which God exists, it also follows that at a time prior to 12 (call it Ti) God believed that Jones would do X at 12. What I argued in my earlier paper (and again in the fourth chapter of my book God and Timelessness)3 is that under the circumstances just imagined, it is not within Jones' power at 72 to refrain from doing X. But if we assume that a free action is such that it is within the agent's power to refrain from its performance, we must conclude that Jones' doing X at 12 is not a free action. Since this argument can be generalized for all human agents and for all times, it follows that if God exists and is everlasting and essentially omniscient, no human action is free.
Of course, the crux of this argument rests on the claim that if God believes at T1 that Jones will do X at 12, it is not within Jones' power at 12 to refrain from doing X. Plantinga sketches my earlier argument for this contention as follows: Consider (51) God existed at T1, and God believed at T1 that Jones would do X at T-2 and it was within Jones' power to refrain from doing X at
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What Pike means to say, I believe, is that either (51) That ( Whether or not it is logically possible for some event in the present to determine some circumstance in the past, it is not within the power of a human being so to act at a given time that a belief held prior to that time was not held prior to that time or that a being (person) who existed prior to that time did not exist prior to that time. This I take to be a conceptual truth.
In his criticism of the argument just sketched, Plantinga invites us to consider once again the logical relations between (51) on the one hand, and each of (52), (53) and (54) on the other hand. Taking each of the latter one at a time, Plantinga asks first: "Does (51) entail (52)?" His answer is "No". He goes on:
(52) says that it was within Jones' power to do something-namely refrain from doing x-such that if he had done that thing, then God would have held a false belief at T1. But this does not follow from (51). If Jones had refrained from X, then a proposition that God did infant believe would have been false; but if Jones had refrained from X at 12, then God (since he is omniscient) would not have believed at Ti that Jones will do X at 72--indeed, He would have held the true belief that Jones will refrain from doing X at P2. What follows from (51) is not (52) but only (52'): DIVINE FOREKNO WLEDGE (52') It was within Jones' power to do something such that if he had done it, then a belief that God did hold at T1 would have been false. But (52') is not at all paradoxical and in particular does not imply that it was within Jones' power to do something that would have brought it about that God held a false belief.
It is at this point that Plantinga offers a look at the problem from what he calls "the vantage point of possible worlds". What follows is the same point made in the passage just cited but framed in the language of possible worlds ontology:
We are told by (51) both that in the actual world God believes that Jones does X at 72 and also that it is within Jones' power to refrain from doing X at T2. Now consider any wprld W in which Jones does refrain from doing X. In that world, a belief that God holds in the actual world-in Kronos-is false. That is, if W had been actual, then a belief that God does infant hold would have been false. But it does not follow that in W God holds a false belief. For it doesn't follow that if W had been actual, God would have believed that Jones would do X at T 2. Indeed, if God is essentially omniscient (omniscient in every world in which He exists) what follows is that in W God did not believe at T1 that Jones will do X at T2; He believed instead that Jones will refrain from X. So (51) by no means implies that it was within Jones' power to bring it about that God held a false belief at T1.
Plantinga then extends the same pattern of reasoning in an effort to show that neither (53) nor (54) is entailed by (51). Consider a world W in which Jones exercises the power assigned to him in (51), that is, refrains from doing X. This is not a world in which Jones so acts as to make it the case that a belief held by God at Ti is not held by God at Ti nor is it a world in which Jones so acts as to bring it about that a being (person) who existed at Ti did not exist at T1. We can assume that God exists at Ti in Wand that He holds a belief at Ti concerning Jones' action at T2. All we need add is that in W, God does not hold the same belief that he holds in the actual world. In W, God believes that Jones refrains from doing X. Thus (51) entails nothing that is in the least strange or awkward. If God exists at Ti and believes at Ti that Jones will do X at T2, Jones may still have the power at T2 to refrain from doing X. To say that Jones has such power is simply to say that there is a possible world Win which he refrains from doing X at 72. This, of course, is a world in which God does not believe that Jones does X at T2.
II

Given any possible world in which God exists and is everlasting and essentially omniscient, if Jones does X at T2, God believes at
Ti that Jones does X at T2; and if Jones refrains from doing X at 772, God believes at Ti that Jones refrains from doing X at T2. So much is clear and quite beyond dispute. The question of interest, however, does not concern these straightforward and uncomplicated implications of the doctrine of essential omniscience. Of primary concern is the value to be assigned to the claim that it is within Jones' power at T2 to refrain from doing X even though, in fact, he does X at T2. Let's look at this idea in a bit more detail.
What is it to say of a given agent, Jones, that it is within his power to do X? Plantinga apparently thinks that a statement of this sort can be analyzed in terms of possible worlds. What it means, so he seems to be supposing, is that there is some possible world in which Jones does X. In the special case in which Jones does not do X (that is, does not exercise his power to do X) what we say is that in the actual world Jones does not do X, but in some other possible world Jones does X. This, however, is clearly wrong if it is meant as a complete analysis. If the statement "It is within Jones' power to do X" means "There is a possible world in which Jones does X", then its negation "It is not the case that it is within Jones' power to do X" would have to mean "It is not the case that there is a possible world in which Jones does X". This last, of course, is absurd. Though it is not within my power to jump over a ten foot fence, there is some possible world in which I do just that. That I jump over the fence is a logical possibility; it is just that it is not within my power to do it. Given physical conditions C1, C2, C3, and so on, it is not possible for me to jump the fence, that is, it is not within my power to jump the fence.
Could an analysis of this form be cast in the language of possible worlds? It could if we could assume that the notion of possibility therein employed is logical possibility. Since Plantinga proceeds making use of this assumption, let's agree for purposes of discussion. The resulting form of the analysis is then:
Within the subset of possible worlds in which obtain conditions C1, C2, C3, and so on there is no possible world in which I jump the fence.
The point I mean to be emphasizing here is this: The claim that it is not within my power to perform a certain action is not a claim about all possible worlds. If it is a claim about possible worlds at all, it is one that is restricted in scope to a subset of possible worlds that share a certain set of conditions in common. The conditions in question are conditions that obtain in the actual world. This point has a corollary with respect to sentences in which it is affirmed that a certain action is within the power of a given agent. If I say that it is within my power to jump the fence, this is not simply to say that there is a possible world in which I do so. Surely anyone who challenged the original would find it something of a joke to be told that my jumping the fence is within my power because my jumping the fence is a logical possibility. Both the claim that it is and the claim that it is not within my power to perform a certain action are radically fact-infested. If such claims can be analyzed using the notion of logical possibility at all, the significance of the original will require that the logical possibility Going back now to the original problem, we have assumed that Jones does X at 12 and the God exists and is everlasting and essentially omniscient. It follows that God believes at Ti and Jones does X at 172. The question before us is whether it is within Jones' power at T2 to refrain from doing X. Plantinga assumes that this is to ask whether there is a possible world in which Jones refrains from doing Xat T2. His answer is that there is-it is a world 
